

RADIO-TV DEFENSE DIALOG

PART I

PART I

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SUMMARY OF REPORTS CONTAINED IN THIS ISSUE

Senator Mike MANSFIELD was interviewed on Face the Nation. Senator MANSFIELD states that the current Senate amendment to prohibit the use of troops in Cambodia is to make sure the President does what he said he was going to do in bringing the troops out by June 30, and to reassert Congressional interest in the matter. He feels that the responsibility for cleaning out the communist sanctuaries should be placed in the hands of the SVNese, and that other Asian nations should have to deal with the problem of maintaining stability in Cambodia after the US withdraws. Senator MANSFIELD admits that the MCGOVERN/HATFIELD amendment would be an intrusion of the legislative branch into the rights of the executive branch. Senator MANSFIELD favors an all volunteer army. Senator J.W. FULBRIGHT was interviewed on Issues and Answers. Senator FULBRIGHT states that the objective must be to liquidate the war in VN, and that the venture into Cambodia was a disaster. He feels that a negotiated settlement is the only feasible solution. Senator FULBRIGHT states that it only demonstrates the failure and lack of merit of the VNization concept, and that there is no limit to the dangers caused by the operation. Frank MCGEE reports that a twelfth front was opened in Cambodia. Jean LACOTURE was interviewed.

FACE THE NATION 12:30 PM MAY 17

CBS TV

Senator Mike Mansfield Interviewed

QUESTION: Senator MANSFIELD, the President has promised to have all American troops out of Cambodia by June 30. The Senate is going ahead with an amendment to prohibit the use of troops there.

Should it be taken to mean that the Senate of the United States doesn't trust the President to live up to his promise?

SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD: Quite the contrary. It's in support of the President.

Reassert Congressional Interest

QUESTION: Senator MANSFIELD, what is the point of supporting the President if you think he's going to do it in the first place, and by a means that has some constitutional doubt about it in the second place?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: Just to make sure that he does what he says he's going to do, and to reassert the Congressional -- the Senatorial interest in this particular instance, in what he has said should be done in bringing to an end an ill starred adventure.

QUESTION: Well, Senator, as a purely

practical matter, with the House of Representatives constituted as it is today, and unlikely to support any of these various moves now under consideration in the Senate, isn't this somewhat of an academic exercise?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: Not at all. The House must face up to its responsibility. We will as a body, and individually. That's the way it should be. And if the House doesn't want to act, that's its business. But the Senate must act and will act because we've laid out a schedule facing up to this issue, first through the COOPER/CHURCH amendment, second through bringing up the rescinding of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, third a debate on the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief in war making, opposed to the Congressional powers of war declaring under the constitution, and specifically the advise and consent clause of the Senate.

And then, of course, at the end when the big defense bill comes up, we'll have the MCGOVERN/HATFIELD amendment, the MUSKIE amendment, and others which will be attached to that bill, or at least the attempt will be made.

To Be Used As Protective Device

QUESTION: Senator, you said that this is to make sure the President does what

PART I

he says he would do.

Does a trustworthy President need that kind of insurance from a Senate that trusts him?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: Oh, yes. We trust the President, but we think this is a protective device which will give him support and strength when he needs it, because there will be other voices, undoubtedly, at that time trying to bring about a change in the situation.

QUESTION: What about US forces that are in combat on June 30? What should they do?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: Oh, they should be out before June 30, and any combat should be undertaken by the SVNese, not only in Cambodia, but along the Cambodian border.

After all, there's a one million man army there. Put them up there and get our boys out, and keep them coming out.

Responsibility On SVN

QUESTION: Supposing the VNese -- the NVNese -- rebuild these sanctuaries in Cambodia; stock them heavily with arms in a matter of five, six, seven months.

Should the President's arms be tied so that he cannot once again clean them out?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: No, the President's arms should be loosened, but the responsibility should be placed on THIEU and KY, on the SVNese.

We understand the VNization program has been a success. They have all the modern equipment in the world. Put that army up there, and let us get out. And get out soon.

Intrusion Into Executive Branch

QUESTION: But Senator, with respect to the MCGOVERN/HATFIELD resolution, which lays out a timetable for withdrawal.

Can it be argued legitimately that that's an intrusion of the legislative branch into the rights of the executive branch?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: I suppose it could be, and I went along with that thesis until Cambodia. But as far as I was concerned, Cambodia tore it.

Let Others Work For Stability

QUESTION: Let me ask you, do you think that the Administration can in fact get out by June 30, and that there will be then a safe and stable situation left in Cambodia?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: I would hope, in answer to the first part of your question, that they could. And I think the President will attempt to do so.

But whether or not there will be a stable situation in Cambodia as a result, I cannot say definitely. But my off hand answer would be no, there would not be.

QUESTION: Should the United States work to keep a stable, pro democratic or pro Western situation in Cambodia?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: No.

QUESTION: We should do nothing if it goes communist, for example?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: We should do nothing. Let the SVNese handle it from their end. Let the Thai's handle it from the other. And let us not become involved.

Because all of SEA is not vital to the security of this nation.

And there are two documents I carry around with me all the time.

One is the first amendment to the Constitution, which is immaterial in this discussion at the moment.

And the other is the casualty list. And the casualty lists now are in excess of 325,000 as a result of this war in which we are engaged in SEA. And of that is about 50,000 is dead -- would be included in the dead. And of that number, about 42,000 have been killed in combat, and something in excess of 7000 have been killed in non combat activities in SEA.

QUESTION: The communists should be able to have all of SEA if they want it, including Thailand?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: No, that's up to the countries there to defend themselves. We've given them plenty of help -- Thailand, Laos, VN. I don't know what more we could do. We've spent over a hundred billion dollars in that area. We've shed the blood of 325,000 Americans.

Are we going to keep on going and going and going on?

Will Not Induce Negotiations

QUESTION: Senator MANSFIELD, it's

PART I

widely believed in parts of Washington that President NIXON's actions in Cambodia are part of a broad foreign policy aimed at the Soviet Union; that this is a kind of a parallel to President KENNEDY's actions first in Vienna, then perhaps in Cuba; that he was trying to impress his credibility, as President KENNEDY used to say.

Do you think that this is part of a NIXON policy -- President NIXON policy to show a kind of policy and a kind of voice to both the Soviet Union and also to Hanoi?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: I haven't the slightest idea. To the best of my knowledge he has not discussed this with any member of the Senate. And I cannot answer your question.

QUESTION: Do you think it would be effective -- the Cambodian move and the bombing of NVN -- in bringing Hanoi to the peace table?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: I do not.

QUESTION: Why not?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: Because I think it will stiffen their back bone, it will make them more intransigent than ever, it will prolong the war, and make peace more difficult.

Favor Volunteer Army

QUESTION: Senator, there has been a great deal of discussion, as you know, about the question of draft of the Reserve Officers Training Corps, ROTC as the kids call it, and for an all volunteer Army.

How do you think that would work?

SENATOR MANSFIELD: Well, I'm for an all volunteer Army. I think the GATES Commission ought to be given -- report ought to be given the most serious consideration when the extension of the draft is concerned.

I'm against the draft. I voted against it. I don't intend to vote for its extension this time.

As far as the ROTC is concerned, I'm disturbed about what's happening to that organization on the campuses of this country.

And I do not approve of what's been done because the ROTC furnishes a civilian input into the armed services of this country. It keeps alive the idea of civilian supremacy. And I think it's worth what it has cost this country and the colleges.

ISSUES AND ANSWERS 1:30 PM MAY 17
ABC TV

Senator J.W. Fulbright Interviewed

QUESTION: In a Life Magazine article, former Secretary of Defense Clark CLIFFORD calls President NIXON's Cambodia decision a formula for perpetual war, and urges complete withdrawal of all American forces from SEA by the end of 1971.

Do you favor this approach?

SENATOR J.W. FULBRIGHT: I do. I would hope it would be sooner than that, but that should be the outside limit.

QUESTION: Well, are you ready now to support any Congressional move which sets a timetable for American withdrawal, and a specific cut off point for the end of the American involvement?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Well, you're getting ahead of the actual procedure.

The first position is the CHURCH/COOPER one which I favor at the moment. It might be untimely to favor that at this point just for practical political reasons in the Senate. But undoubtedly the objective of that, I undoubtedly at the proper time will support it.

Objective Is To End The War

QUESTION: What would you do, Senator, if the NVNese and the VC return to those sanctuaries and begin to build up again, indeed enlarge them, to threaten the whole lower half of SVN?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Listen, undoubtedly they will. But listen, the objective is to get out and to liquidate the war.

The President said this in his campaign. What we are trying to do is to end the war in VN. We're not trying to prolong it.

The VNization and what he's doing here is a program, as you said a moment ago, for an endless war. We don't accept it.

Of course they'll do that. This venture into Cambodia is a disaster. It can accomplish nothing.

They will no doubt make great claims of enormous stores and all that. They've done it time and

PART I

again. These same military people, in their sweep across Ashau Valley, and all these things, these same stories.

(Words unintelligible) the trouble with us, or at least supposedly, is we've heard this kind of story time and time again since 1955. And they have never turned out to be true.

Negotiated Settlement Is Only Feasible Solution

QUESTION: Senator, you said before we paused for a moment, that you feel the NVNese forces and the VC will move back into those Cambodian sanctuaries after Americans depart.

Now what would you do if they do? Would you have any objections to the SVNese troops going back in again to clean them out?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I would if we have any control over them. The objective of this all is to end this war. The President said that was his objective. He does not end it by widening it.

And I certainly would object to it, and I think we must -- a negotiated peace, a negotiated settlement of this war is the only feasible solution.

The pattern that the French followed after a hundred years of occupation and ownership of this land as a colony is the only one I can think of that holds any reasonable promise of success.

And this is the objective of everything I try to do -- to bring the President to this conclusion.***

Cambodian Venture Shows Lack Of Merit In VNization

QUESTION: What if we get to the point where we're down to, perhaps, 100,000 Americans left in VN, and the Cambodian sanctuaries have been reoccupied, and the President could make a very clear case that those last 100,000 troops are going to be imperiled unless the sanctuaries are again invaded.

Would you be against any action...

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Long before that time, if he hasn't reached a negotiated settlement, he certainly will face a disaster.

This Cambodian venture, and the accompanying effects, only demonstrate

the complete failure and lack of merit of the VNization concept. It is not a viable one. It had no merit to begin with.

We have been hoodwinked, if I may use that word, in this program. The only solution I can see is a political settlement after the fashion of the French.

QUESTION: Well, Senator, part of the objective in this Cambodian operation was to jolt the NVNese into finally negotiating meaningfully.

Don't you see any prospects whatever that this could succeed in doing that?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: No, it will have the opposite effect, and it will stiffen the backs of both the Chinese and the Russians.

We've put the the Chinese and the Russians on the spot. (Words unintelligible) the VNese, everybody knows this.

Everything we capture, for example in Cambodia they will replenish probably two times over.

No, it will make it more difficult. I think this makes much more difficult a negotiated settlement. And the President months ago said his policy was negotiation, not confrontation.

It seems to me these actions are directly contrary to his own announced policy.

No Limit To Where The Expansion May End

QUESTION: You said that this action puts the Chinese and the Russians on the spot. Does this mean that you have grave concern that somehow the enlargement of this theater of operations, somehow will draw in the Chinese particularly?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Well it would increase their apprehension about what our ultimate purposes are. They will no doubt increase their aid to NVN. After all, that's the origin of the means, the mechanics, the weapons of war, are China and Russia. And they will no doubt do that.

And also it endangers the success of the SALT Talks with the Russians. And it will cause apprehension that we will move into Laos, of course. We're already there -- without troops, but in many ways.

And there's no limit to where this might be expanded. I think it's a

PART I

very dangerous procedure.

FRANK MCGEE REPORT 6:00 PM MAY 17
NBC TV

Twelfth Front Opened In Cambodia

FRANK MCGEE: 10,000 SVNese troops supported by heavy armor drove into southern Cambodia today. It was the twelfth front opened by SVNese and or American troops since the drive into Cambodia began.

In this drive the Americans are supplying aerial and logistical support.

Jean Lacoture Interviewed

MCGEE: An acknowledged expert on Indochina and the VN war is the French scholar Jean LACOTURE. He's written somewhat sympathetically about the American involvement in VN.

But in an interview with David BURRINGTON, LACOTURE was critical of the intervention in Cambodia, and said the United States seems to be repeating mistakes the French made in Indochina in the 1950's.

Sees Dangerous Enlargement Of War

JEAN LACOTURE: I suppose they will succeed in pushing the VNese away this (word unintelligible) province.

But after that will come the idea of supporting the Lon NOL government, and to save the Lon NOL government, as to save DIEM in SVN ten years ago.

And this is the beginning of a larger operation that the first -- the technical operation, to attack the VNese in Svaereang (?), is relatively simple, and with a good cause.

But after that we come the Lon NOL government to save and that will be an enlargement of the war. And very dangerous.

Wants To Negotiate From Position Of Strength

DAVID BURRINGTON: Do you feel that perhaps President NIXON thinks that victory now again is possible in Indochina?

LACOTURE: I believe so. I think

he wants again to negotiate, but from the position of strength. And I suppose he thinks that after a victory in the (word unintelligible) province, he will be stronger to negotiate.

Sees It As A Disaster

BURRINGTON: In the context of this new development, do you think that the United States is making the same mistakes that France made in Indochina? Or is it avoiding these mistakes?

LACOTURE: I think it's, well, more or less the same kind of mistakes.

BURRINGTON: If you don't mind speculating a bit, how do you think history will see this decision of President NIXON?

LACOTURE: Well, you know, after all we are journalists and we are not historians. And I suppose if we were both historians we should be very cautious to give a definitive judgment on such a decision.

From my point of view right now, I feel it, I see it as a disaster as a friend of the Cambodians and as a friend of Americans too.
